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In a documentary called Attrazione D’amore, 
the cinematographer Frank Scheffer provides 
footage from a lunch concert at Amsterdam’s Royal 
Concertgebouw. When the orchestra starts to play 
Mozart’s Piano Concerto No.  20 in D  minor, it 
becomes apparent that the renowned pianist Maria 
João Pires had made a mistake. As the director of the 
concert, Riccardo Chailly, recounts in the film:
“She was shocked because she was expecting us to 
play another concerto. So when I started the first bar of 
the D-minor concerto she kind of jumped and panicked 
like an electroshock and she couldn’t consider even 
moving ahead playing. Then we talked a moment and 
she told me that ‘was expecting to play a completely 
different piece. I do what I can do – if I remember.’ 
And the miracle is that she has such a memory that 
she could, within a minute, switch to a new concerto 
without making one mistake.”
A couple of years after the documentary was first 
broadcast, the film was uploaded and re-discove-
red by an audience online1. The popularity of the 
clip partly can be explained by how the camera 
captures the strong and changing emotional displays 
of Maria João Pires, which continue after she starts 
playing and become a part of her performance of the 
concerto. Even though she had made a mistake, it is 
a mistake that she recovers from, and the resulting 
performance arguably turns out to be more power-
ful than it would have without the mistake. As we 
read and discussed the article by Klemp et al. (2016), 
we talked about this and other mistakes, including 
mistakes we had made ourselves, that we had seen 
others make, and that we had analyzed as part of 
our research on dentistry, sports, and education. We 
found the approach of the article stimulating, espe-
cially in its emphasis of the insights of practitioners 
– in this case jazz musicians – over the theoretical 
distinctions commonly found in the research litera-
ture on errors and mistakes.
A substantial portion of the research on human 
errors has been conducted from within the traditions 
of cognitive science and human factors. In a manner 
characteristic of these traditions, Reason (1990) 
distinguishes between three types of mistakes: errors 
of planning, errors of storage, and errors of execu-
tion. People, that is, might come up with the wrong 
plan, forget the plan they had, or fail to execute 
the plan as they intended. Classifications like these 
appeal to commonsense and are commonly appli-
cable to a wide range of situations. Maria João 
Pires had brought the wrong sheet of music to the 
concert hall. Not being able to rely on any written 
notes, she had to depend on her familiarity with 
the concerto. She had played it with the orchestra 
during the previous season and, as a distinguished 
Mozartian, she had undoubtedly played it numerous 
times before. Nevertheless, her ability to rely on her 
“memory” and “switch to a new concerto without 
making one mistake” was still found to be a miracle 
by the director. Using the terminology of Reason 
(1990), Maria João Pires made an error in planning, 
but miraculously no error in storage or execution.
Cognitivist conceptions of mistakes, of the type 
suggested by Reason (1990), are labeled the “stan-
dard view” by Klemp et al.: “The standard view is 
that a mistake is the same as an error, a break from 
plan due to a faulty head or hand. It is to be avoided, 
recontextualized, hidden, or conceded with chagrin 
as an embarrassment.” (2016, p. 110) This pers-
pective is contrasted with the approach they them-
selves propose. Their critique of the standard view 
draws on two sources: on the one hand, academic 
conceptions of action that are different from, and 
proposed as alternatives to, cognitive theorizing; 
and on the other, jazz music and jazz musicians’ 
expressed understandings of their own improvised 
performances.
There are clear parallels between the ways in 
which Klemp et al. develop their critique and how 
theories of “situated learning” and “situated cogni-
tion” (e.g., Lave & Wenger, 1991; Brown, Collins & 
Duguid, 1988) were proposed as alternatives in the 
field of education. In both cases, there are strong ties 
to the analytic histories of studies of situated action 
and particularly to ethnomethodology and conver-
sation analysis. Moreover, in both cases, the intro-
duction of a new domain is instrumental for the 
suggested shift in perspective. In the case of situa-
ted learning, the move was one from cohort orga-
nized teaching in classrooms to apprenticeships. 
The notion of information transfer might make some 
sense in classrooms, as the teacher is saying things 
that the students then should remember on later 
occasions, but it seems harder to apply to the less 
formal settings in which apprentices train. Similarly, 
the terminology of plans and executions is much 
more easily applied to a piano concerto than it is to 
an improvised jazz performance. In contrast to the 
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former case, a wrong note in the latter “is errant 
only to what has already happened, and it can be 
made less errant by rearranging what happens next” 
(Klemp et al., 2016, p. 110).
A central message of Klemp et al.’s paper is that 
when we listen to an improvised jazz performance, 
“we hear neither plans, nor mistakes, but takes in 
which expectations and difficulties get worked on 
in the medium of notes, tones and rhythms.” (ibid.) 
Following this, one could perhaps argue that most 
of our lives, including our engagement in mundane 
conversations, is more like improvised jazz than a 
piano concerto. We are not following scripts so 
much as adapting, moment-by-moment, to changing 
circumstances, thereby being reflexively involved in 
changing those circumstances (cf. Suchman, 1987). 
The question remains, however, how far the insights 
drawn from improvised jazz are applicable to other 
fields of conduct. The variation with regards to plans, 
takes, and mistakes seem to be endless, and, in parti-
cular, our discussions about this question tended to 
circulate around two interconnected themes: how 
the recognizability of mistakes, including those 
that Klemp et al. reconceptualise as mis-takes, are 
unavoidably tied to criteria and the wide variety of 
consequences that they engender.
Klemp et al. (2016) do not want to call the note 
played by Thelonious Monk that they carefully 
analyse in the article an error; hence they intro-
duce the notion of mis-take in place of mistake. In 
the recording they hear “signs of struggle” (p. 106), 
which set up “a challenge for Monk and his liste-
ners” (p. 107). We have listened for these signs and 
discussed in what ways the passage was challenging 
to us. The three of us have different experiences 
of jazz music, music theory, and musical notation: 
one is completely unfamiliar with these domains, 
one has some passing knowledge, and the third has 
more substantive knowledge of both theory and 
practice. Notably, this did not seem too decisive for 
whether we heard a mis-take in the solo by Monk. 
Sometimes we heard it, other times we did not. But 
it had consequences for how we heard the note in its 
sequential context, for how we accounted for hearing 
or not hearing the mis-take, and for our ability to 
follow, understand, agree, or disagree with the analy-
sis of the note by Klemp et al.
As the authors note: “Any note might be a mistake 
or not depending on context, the rules of harmony, 
the player’s intention or the audience’s expectations.” 
(ibid.). Without access to what Monk intended to 
do, and given that Monk’s style of playing could be 
challenging for an audience without him necessa-
rily making any mistakes, the issue of what consti-
tutes a mistake becomes complicated. In a Mozart 
concerto, the criteria for making such judgments are 
easier to formulate. In general, however, the distinc-
tion between success and failure, like the distinction 
between a take and a mistake, is often hard to draw 
and contingent on criteria that are impossible to 
fully specify. In dentistry, for instance, the difference 
between a root canal filling that is “good enough” 
and one that cannot be accepted and has to be redone 
is not only tied to technical quality, but also to risks 
of complications, the skill of the dentist, the coope-
ration of the patient, economic factors, et cetera 
(Dahlström et al. 2017). Dentists regularly express 
that it is almost impossible to tell whether they have 
succeeded with a root canal filling or not: despite 
everything going according to plan, and radiographs 
and other evidence indicating that the procedure was 
executed correctly, the patient nevertheless might 
return with symptoms a couple of months later.
Many mistakes, in medicine and life more gene-
rally, are tied to risks and circumstances over which 
people have little control. It is only in hindsight 
and through their consequences that these mistakes 
emerge. Returning to the D minor piano concerto by 
Mozart discussed earlier, it could have been argued at 
the time of its original performance on February 11th, 
1785 that the composer, in selecting the piece for his 
Viennese audience, was making a serious mistake. 
Prior to this performance, Mozart had respected the 
convention of treating instrumental concertos as pure 
entertainment. One can then only imagine the reac-
tion of the audience that night when they listened to 
his first concerto in a minor key, and were faced with 
aching anxiety and shadows from the world of the 
doomed; shivers of fear from the cellos and the deep 
of the double basses; crushing loneliness. Certainly in 
making this decision Mozart took a major risk. If the 
picky Viennese nobility, on whose financial support 
Mozart depended, disliked the piece he stood to lose 
their favor. In retrospect, however, it is clear that 
by breaking the rules Mozart transformed the piano 
concerto forever, from joyful entertainment into a 
vehicle for deep emotional reflection. Perhaps this 
was something that Mozart envisioned, but he had to 
wait to find out how the audience would respond to 
this break with their expectations.
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A mistake’s consequentiality depends thorou-
ghly on the retrospective and prospective relations 
within which it is embedded and to which it contri-
butes. Klemp et al. draw attention to how takes and 
mis-takes, as concrete social phenomena, are inevi-
tably produced, recognized, and responded to within 
courses of situated, temporally unfolding activities: 
“Moments, like notes played on a keyboard, become 
consequential – even momentous – by their simul-
taneous connections to things that have already 
happened and are about to happen.” (2016, p. 106) 
Within such contextures of activity, the occurrence 
of a mistake is consequential in and as of the signi-
ficance it has for involved parties in shaping their 
understandings of what just happened and what they 
should do next. Just what is projected as a mistake’s 
relevant next move, and just who is obligated or entit-
led to respond, are thus subject to enormous variabi-
lity depending on the locally oriented details of the 
mistake, its circumstances, and the identities and 
relations of the parties to it.
The different action-recognition-response 
sequences distinguishing Thelonious Monk’s mis-
take, Maria João Pires’saved mistake and Mozart’s 
could-have-been mistake illustrate the central point 
that mistakes possess an occasioned consequentiality, 
a feature that can ramify: the Boston Globe2 reports 
on a 74-year-old woman undergoing a routine medi-
cal procedure to relieve back pain during which the 
attending neurosurgeon mistakenly injected into 
her spine a dye not intended for intracathel use. The 
surgeon immediately admitted the mistake to the 
patient’s sons; the patient died; hospital and govern-
ment inquiries were launched; the insurer’s lawyers 
sent letters to the sons denying a mistake was made; 
a lawsuit was launched and settled; and the hospi-
tal instituted new procedures designed to prevent 
similar future mistakes. Indeed, the occurrence of 
a mistake can itself occasion the reflexive recons-
truction of the very circumstances in which it is 
embedded. In an article describing his experience of 
playing pick-up basketball, Macbeth (2012) recounts 
an occasion when, in possession of the ball and 
moving towards the basket, he spots another player 
apparently mirroring his own pace and trajectory of 
movement, and experiences the emergence of a joint 
enterprise: both players, with synchronized purpose, 
creating an “opening”. When Macbeth passes the 
ball to the second player, however, he discovers the 
player to be a member of the opposing team. In the 
surprised response of the player receiving an unex-
pected pass, the pass becomes a mistake, the “team-
mates” become reconfigured as opponents, the 
cultivated synchrony of their bodies becomes a coin-
cidence, and the ‘opening’ is revealed as a chimera.
Klemp et  al. (2016) include the following 
epigraph, attributed to “Drummer E. W. Wainwright 
(conversation with Klemp, 2001)”: “A mistake is the 
most beautiful thing in the world. It is the only way 
you can get to some place you’ve never been before. I 
try to make as many as I can. Making a mistake is the 
only way that you can grow.”(p. 106). Such formu-
lations of mistakes have a resonance and relevance 
for certain types of contexts, and reconstructing a 
context within which this formulation constitutes a 
reasonable description of mistakes becomes part of 
the work of understanding the epigraph. Here the 
attribution of the quotation’s source forms a central 
detail of its structure of intelligibility. The quotation 
and its attribution function together to comprise a 
particular configuration of category of actor (drum-
mer), setting (ethnographic interview), and course 
of action (being asked for and providing a response 
to an interview question, which itself involves the 
production of an account of the work of being a 
musician). Within this reconstructed context, the 
description of mistakes as beautiful and produc-
tive things seems apt, even instructive. But given a 
differently categorized source and course of action, 
say “Neurosurgeon Dr. Steven Hwang (malpractice 
hearing, 2014)”, the identical quotation may occa-
sion an alternative uptake by the reader.
All of this is to say that recognizing a mistake, 
determining one’s relation and stance to it, and 
working out one’s response, all as part of a tempo-
rally-unfolding contexture of activity, is the work of 
mistakes, in and as the situated reasoning and action 
of relevant parties. This work involves the compe-
tency to apply the criteria to recognize a mistake and 
its occasioned consequentiality. Experts, like Monk, 
already own the criteria. But how about those who do 
not? For us, that is the central issue that ties together 
mistakes, competence, and instruction.
Toward the end of their article, Klemp et  al. 
argue that in schools student mistakes often are 
recorded and used to sort students institutionally: 
“the very place that promises learning produces 
also constant and often debilitating failure” (2016, 
p. 116). Although this function of mistakes is pres-
ent in schools, the recognition of student mistakes 
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is also integral to teaching and learning in many 
cases. In an article on classroom discourse as impro-
visation, Erickson notes: “Mistakes are inevitable, 
since the students are learners; learning is by defi-
nition the acquisition of mastery, not the possession 
of it. The opportunity to learn is the opportunity to 
make mistakes. Moreover, student mistakes provide 
the teacher with the opportunity to teach.” (1982, 
p. 161). In our own work on basketball coaching 
and the teaching and learning of craft (e.g., Evans & 
Reynolds, 2016; Lindwall & Ekström, 2012), much 
of the teaching that goes on is occasioned by various 
mistakes, and takes the form of correction, without 
this necessarily being oriented to as failures on behalf 
of the learners. Learning by doing necessarily implies 
that learners engage in activities before they are able 
to perform or assess these activities in competent 
ways. By allowing learners to do that, and by treating 
mistakes as an inevitable part of learning, instructors 
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